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Abstract
Recently, algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have been deployed in real-world security
applications, such as the placement of checkpoints and canine units at Los Angeles International Airport.
These algorithms assume that the defender (security personnel) can commit to a mixed strategy, a so-called
Stackelberg model. As pointed out by Kiekintveld et al. (2009), in these applications, generally, multiple
resources need to be assigned to multiple targets, resulting in an exponential number of pure strategies for the
defender. In this paper, we study how to compute optimal Stackelberg strategies in such games, showing that
this can be done in polynomial time in some cases, and is NP-hard in others.
1. Introduction
In settings with multiple self-interested agents, the optimal action for one agent to take generally depends on
what other agents do. Game theory provides various solution concepts, which specify what it means to act
optimally in such a domain. As a result, there has been much interest in the multiagent systems community in
thedesignofalgorithmsforcomputinggame-theoreticsolutions. Mostofthisworkhasfocusedoncomputing
Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium consists of a proﬁle of strategies (one for each player) such that no
player individually wants to deviate; strategies are allowed to be mixed, that is, randomizations over pure
strategies. This concept has some appealing properties, including that every ﬁnite game has at least one
Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). Unfortunately, from a computational perspective, Nash equilibrium is a
more cumbersome concept: it is PPAD-complete to ﬁnd even one Nash equilibrium, even in two-player
games (Daskalakis, Goldberg, & Papadimitriou, 2009; Chen, Deng, & Teng, 2009). The optimal equilibrium
(for any reasonable deﬁnition of optimal) is NP-hard to ﬁnd (or even to approximate), even in two-player
games (Gilboa & Zemel, 1989; Conitzer & Sandholm, 2008).
An alternative solution concept (for two-player games) is the following. Suppose that player one (the
leader) is able to commit to a mixed strategy; then, player two (the follower) observes this commitment,
and chooses a response. Such a commitment model is known as a Stackelberg model, and we will refer to
an optimal mixed strategy for player one to commit to as an (optimal) Stackelberg strategy. For example,
consider the game given in normal form in Figure 1. This game has a unique Nash equilibrium, (U,L) (the
L R
U 2,1 4,0
D 1,0 3,1
Figure 1: Example game where commitment helps.
game is solvable by iterated strict dominance). However, if player one (the row player) can commit, then
she is better off committing to playing D, which incentivizes player two to play R, resulting in a utility of 3
for player one. It is even better for player one to commit to the mixed strategy 49% U, 51% D, which still
incentivizes player two to play R, so that player one gets an expected utility of 3.49. Of course, it is even
better to commit to 49.9% U, 50.1% D—etc. At the limit strategy of 50% U, 50% D, player two is indifferent
1between L and R. In this case, we assume player two breaks ties in player one’s favor (plays R), so that we
have a well-deﬁned Stackelberg strategy (50% U, 50% D). In two-player zero-sum games, Nash equilibrium
strategies and Stackelberg strategies both coincide with minimax strategies (and, hence, with each other), due
to von Neumann’s minimax theorem (von Neumann, 1928).
Interestingly, for a two-player normal-form game (not necessarily zero-sum), the optimal Stackelberg
strategy can be found in polynomial time, using a set of linear programs (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2006; von
Stengel & Zamir, 2010).1 Besides this computational beneﬁt over Nash equilibrium, with Stackelberg strate-
gies there is effectively no equilibrium selection problem (the problem that if there are multiple equilibria, it
is not clear according to which one to play).
The computation of Stackelberg strategies has recently found some real-world applications in security
domains. In these games, the defender (security personnel) places security resources (e.g., guards) at various
potential targets (possibly in a randomized manner), and then the attacker chooses a target to attack. The
defender takes the role of the leader. Los Angeles International Airport now uses an algorithm for computing
Stackelberg strategies to place checkpoints and canine units randomly (Paruchuri et al., 2008; Pita et al.,
2009).
However, as was pointed out by Kiekintveld et al. (2009), the applicability of these techniques to security
domains is limited by the fact that the defender generally has exponentially many pure strategies, so that it
is not feasible to write out the entire normal form of the game. Speciﬁcally, if there are m indistinguishable
defensive resources, and n targets to which they can be assigned (n > m), then there are
￿n
m
￿
pure strategies
(allocations) for the defender. Kiekintveld et al. point out that while the LAX application was small enough
to enumerate all strategies, this is not the case for new applications, including the problem of assigning
Federal Air Marshals to ﬂights (Tsai, Rathi, Kiekintveld, Ordonez, & Tambe, 2009). They provide a nice
framework for representing this type of problem; we follow this framework in this paper (and review it in the
following section). However, their paper leaves open the computational complexity of ﬁnding the optimal
Stackelberg strategy in their framework. In this paper, we resolve the complexity of all the major variants in
their framework, in some cases giving polynomial-time algorithms, and in other cases giving NP-hardness
results.
2. Problem Description and Notation
Following Kiekintveld et al. (2009), we consider the following two-player general-sum game. Player one (the
“leader” or “defender”) commits to a mixed strategy to allocate a set of resources to defend a set of targets.2
Player two (the “follower” or “attacker”) observes the commitment and then picks one of the targets to attack.
The utilities of the players depend on which target was attacked and whether that target was defended.
We will consider several variants of this game. Resources of the leader can be either homogeneous, or
there can be several types of resources, each with different limitations on what they can defend. It can either
be the case that a resource can be assigned to at most one target, or it can be the case that a resource can be
assigned to a subset of the targets (such a subset is called a schedule). As we will see, the complexity depends
on the size of these schedules.
We will use the following notation to describe different variants of the problem.
• Targets. Described by a set T (|T| = n). A target t is covered if there is a resource assigned to t (in
the case of no schedules), or if a resource is assigned to a schedule that includes t.
• Schedules. Described by a collection of subsets of targets S ⊆ 2T. Here, s ∈ S is a subset of targets
that can be simultaneously covered by some resource. We assume that any subset of a schedule is also
1. It is not known whether linear programs are solvable in strongly polynomial time, that is, with no dependence on the sizes of the
input numbers at all. Consequently, it is not known whether any of the problems in this paper can be solved in strongly polynomial
time.
2. In this paper, we assume that the set of resources is ﬁxed, as is the case in practice in the short term. For long-term planning, it may
be useful to consider settings where additional resources can be obtained at a cost, but we will not do so in this paper.
2a schedule, that is, if s′ ⊆ s and s ∈ S, then s′ ∈ S. When resources are assigned to individual targets,
we have (by a slight abuse of notation) S = T ∪ {∅}, where ∅ corresponds to not covering any target.
• Resources. Described by a set Ω (|Ω| = m). When there are different types of resources, there is a
function A : Ω ￿ 2S, where A(ω) is the set of schedules to which resource ω can be assigned. We
assume that if s′ ⊆ s and s ∈ A(ω), then s′ ∈ A(ω)—that is, if a resource can cover a set of targets
simultaneously, then it can also cover any subset of that set of targets simultaneously. If resources are
homogeneous, then we assume every resource can cover all schedules, that is, A(ω) = S for all ω ∈ Ω.
• Utility functions. If target t is attacked, the defender’s utility is Uc
d(t) if t is covered, or Uu
d (t) if t is
not covered. The attacker’s utility is Uc
a(t) if t is covered, or Uu
a(t) if t is not covered. We assume
Uc
d(t) ≥ Uu
d (t) and Uc
a(t) ≤ Uu
a(t). We note that it makes no difference to the players’ utilities
whether a target is covered by one resource or by more than one resource.
LP notation. We will use linear programs in all of our positive results (polynomial-time algorithms). We
now describe some of the variables used in these linear programs.
• ct is the probability of target t being covered.
• cs is the probability of schedule s being covered.
• cω,s is the probability of resource ω being assigned to schedule s.
Let c denote the vector of probabilities (c1,...,cn). Then, the utilities of the leader and the follower can be
computed as follows, given c and the target t being attacked:
Ud(t,c) = ctUc
d(t) + (1 − ct)Uu
d (t)
Ua(t,c) = ctUc
a(t) + (1 − ct)Uu
a(t)
These equalities are implicit in all of our linear programs and, for brevity, are not repeated.
Standard multiple LPs approach. As a benchmark and to illustrate some of the ideas, we ﬁrst describe
the standard algorithm for computing a Stackelberg strategy in two-player normal-form games in our nota-
tion (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2006; von Stengel & Zamir, 2010). This approach creates a separate LP for every
follower pure strategy—i.e., one for every target t∗. This LP solves for the optimal leader strategy under the
constraint that the follower’s best response is t∗. Once we have solved all these n LPs, we compare the n
resulting leader strategies and choose the one that is best for the leader; this one must then be optimal overall
(without any constraint on which strategy is the best response). The LP for t∗ is structured as follows. Create
a variable for every leader pure strategy (allocation of resources to schedules) α , representing the probability
that the leader puts on that strategy; and a constraint for every follower pure strategy (target) t, representing
the best-response constraint that the follower should not be better off playing t than t∗.
maximize
X
α
pαUd(α,t∗)
subject to
∀t ∈ T :
X
α
pαUa(α,t) ≤
X
α
pαUa(α,t∗)
X
α
pα = 1
In this paper, we will also follow the approach of solving a separate LP for every t∗ and then comparing the
resulting solutions, though our individual LPs will be different or handled differently.
33. Heterogeneous Resources, Singleton Schedules
We ﬁrst consider the case in which schedules have size 1 or 0 (that is, resources are assigned to individual
targets or not at all, so that S = T ∪ {∅}. We show that here, we can ﬁnd an optimal strategy for the leader
in polynomial time. Kiekintveld et al. (2009) gave a mixed-integer program formulation for this problem,
and proved that feasible solutions for this program correspond to mixed strategies in the game. However,
they did not show how to compute the mixed strategy in polynomial time. Our linear program formulation
is similar to their formulation, and we show how to construct the mixed strategy from the solution, using the
Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem (Birkhoff, 1946).
To solve the problem, we actually solve multiple LPs: for each target t∗, we solve an LP that computes
the best mixed strategy to commit to, under the constraint that the attacker is incentivized to attack t∗. We
then solve all of these LPs, and take the solution that maximizes the leader’s utility. This is similar to the set
of linear programs from Section 2, except those linear programs require a variable for each pure strategy for
the defender, so that these LPs have exponential size in our domain. Instead, we will write a more compact
LP to ﬁnd the probability cω,t of assigning resource ω to target t, for each ω and t ∈ A(ω). (If t / ∈ A(ω),
then there is no variable cω,t.)
maximize Ud(t∗,c)
subject to
∀ω ∈ Ω,∀t ∈ A(ω) : 0 ≤ cω,t ≤ 1
∀t ∈ T : ct =
X
ω∈Ω:t∈A(ω)
cω,t ≤ 1
∀ω ∈ Ω :
X
t∈A(ω)
cω,t ≤ 1
∀t ∈ T : Ua(t,c) ≤ Ua(t∗,c)
The advantage of this LP is that it is more compact than the one that considers all pure strategies. The
downside is that it is not immediately clear whether we can actually implement the computed probabilities
(that is, whether they correspond to a probability distribution over allocations of resources to targets, and how
thismixedstrategycanbefound). Belowweshowthattheobtainedprobabilitiescan, infact, beimplemented.
3.1 Constructing a Strategy that Implements the LP Solution
We will make heavy use of the following theorem (which we state in a somewhat more general form than it
is usually stated).
Theorem 1 (Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, Birkhoff, 1946). Consider an m × n matrix M with real
numbers aij ∈ [0,1], such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
Pn
j=1 aij ≤ 1, and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
Pm
i=1 aij ≤ 1.
Then, there exist matrices M1,M2,...,Mq, and weights w1,w2,...,wq ∈ (0,1], such that:
1.
Pq
k=1 wk = 1;
2.
Pq
k=1 wkMk = M;
3. for each 1 ≤ k ≤ q, the elements of Mk are ak
ij ∈ {0,1};
4. for each 1 ≤ k ≤ q, we have: for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
Pn
j=1 ak
ij ≤ 1, and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
Pm
i=1 ak
ij ≤ 1.
Moreover, q isO((m+n)2), andtheMk andwk canbefoundinO((m+n)4.5)timeusingDulmage-Halperin
algorithm (Dulmage & Halperin, 1955; Chang, Chen, & Huang, 2001).
4Figure 2: An example of how to apply the BvN theorem. Top Left: Resource ω1 can cover targets t1,t2,t3;
ω2 can cover t2,t3. Top Right: The LP returns the marginal probabilities in the table. We must
now obtain these marginal probabilities as a probability mixture over pure strategies, in which
every resource is assigned to a separate target. Bottom: The BvN theorem decomposes the top
right table into a mixture over pure strategies. It ﬁrst places probability .1 on the pure strategy on
the left, then .2 on the pure strategy to the right of that, and so on. It is easily checked that with the
resulting mixture over pure strategies, the marginal probabilities in the top right table are obtained.
Figure 3: A counterexample that shows that with heterogeneous resources and
bipartite schedules, the linear program probabilities are not always im-
plementable. There are 4 targets (shown as circles), 4 schedules (solid
edges), and 2 resources. The resource ωh can be assigned to one of
the horizontal edges and the resource ωd can be assigned to one of the
diagonal edges. In the optimal solution to the LP, the probability of a
resource being assigned to each edge is 0.5, so that it would seem that
the probability of each target being covered is 1. However, it is easy to
see that in reality, the two resources can cover at most 3 of the 4 targets
simultaneously.
Figure 4: A counterexample that shows that with homogeneous resources and schedules of
size two that are not bipartite, the linear program probabilities are not always imple-
mentable. The number of resources is m = 3. 6 targets are represented by vertices,
6 schedules are represented by edges. In the optimal solution to the LP, the prob-
ability of a resource being assigned to each edge is 0.5, so that it would seem that
the probability of each target being covered is 1. However, it is easy to see that in
reality, the three resources can cover at most 5 of the 6 targets simultaneously.
5We can use this theorem to convert the probabilities cω,t that we obtain from our linear programming
approach into a mixed strategy. This is because the cω,t constitute an m×n matrix that satisﬁes the conditions
of the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem. Each Mk that we obtain as a result of this application of the theorem
corresponds to a pure strategy in our domain: Mk consists of entries ck
ω,t ∈ {0,1} (by 3), which we can
interpret to mean that ω is assigned to t if and only if ck
ω,t = 1, because of the conditions on Mk (in 4).
Then, because the weights sum to 1 (by 1), we can think of
Pq
k=1 wkMk as a mixed strategy in our domain,
which gives us the right probabilities (by 2). According to the theorem, we can construct this mixed strategy
(represented as an explicit listing of the pure strategies in its support, together with their probabilities) in
polynomial time. An example is shown on Figure 2. From this analysis, the following theorem follows:
Theorem 2. When schedules have size 1 or 0, we can ﬁnd an optimal Stackelberg strategy in polynomial time,
even with heterogeneous resources. This can be done by solving a set of polynomial-sized linear programs
and then applying the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem.
4. Heterogeneous Resources, Schedules of Size 2, Bipartite Graph
In this section, we consider schedules of size two. When schedules have size two, they can be represented as
a graph, whose vertices correspond to targets and whose edges correspond to schedules. In this section, we
consider the special case where this graph is bipartite, and give an NP-hardness proof for it.
One may wonder why this special case is interesting. In fact, it corresponds to the Federal Air Marshals
domain studied by Kiekintveld et al. (2009). In this domain, ﬂights are targets. If a Federal Air Marshal is
to be scheduled on one outgoing ﬂight from the U.S. (to, say, Europe), and will then return on an incoming
ﬂight, this is a schedule that involves two targets; moreover, there cannot be a schedule consisting of two
outgoing ﬂights or of two incoming ﬂights, so that we have the requisite bipartite structure.
It may seem that the natural approach is to use a generalization of the linear program from the previous
section (or, the mixed integer program by Kiekintveld et al. (2009)) to compute the marginal probabilities
cω,s that resource ω is assigned to schedule s; and, subsequently, to convert this into a distribution over pure
strategies that gives those marginal probabilities. However, it turns out that it is, in some cases, impossible to
ﬁnd such a distribution over pure strategies. That is, the marginal probabilities from the linear program are
not actually implementable. A counterexample is shown in Figure 3. One may wonder if perhaps a different
linear program or other efﬁcient algorithm can be given. We next show that this is unlikely, because ﬁnding
an optimal strategy for the leader in this case is actually NP-hard, even in zero-sum games.
Theorem 3. When resources are heterogeneous, ﬁnding an optimal Stackelberg strategy is NP-hard, even
when schedules have size 2 and constitute a bipartite graph, and the game is zero-sum.
Proof. We reduce an arbitrary satisﬁability instance, given by variables V and clauses C, and reduce it to
a game of the form in the theorem. Figure 5 illustrates the reduction. For each variable in V , we create a
cyclic bipartite graph with 2|C| vertices (where the vertices are targets and the edges are schedules). Also,
for each clause in C, we create another two vertices and an edge between these two vertices. Finally, we
create |C| · (|V | − 1) additional “dummy” schedules, each consisting of two targets with an edge between
them. For each variable xi, we create 2|C| resources, ω1
+xi,...,ω
|C|
+xi (corresponding to +x1—these are |C|
homogeneous resources) and ω1
−xi,...,ω
|C|
−xi (corresponding to −x1—again, these are |C| homogeneous
resources). Resource ω+xk
i (for any k) can be assigned to:
• any even (horizontal) edge in the cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to variable xi;
• any edge corresponding to a clause that includes +xi; and
• any dummy edge.
Similarly, resource ω−xk
i (for any k) can be assigned to:
• any odd (diagonal) edge in the cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to variable xi;
6ω+x1
ω−x1
ω+x2
ω−x2
ω+x3
ω−x3
Figure 5: Illustration for the NP-hardness reduction for heterogeneous resources, schedules of size 2 consti-
tuting a bipartite graph. The boolean formula is (+x1 ∨ −x2 ∨ +x3) ∧ (−x1 ∨ +x2 ∨ +x3) ∧
(−x1 ∨+x2 ∨−x3). There are 36 targets (shown as circles), 27 schedules (shown as solid edges),
and 6 types of resources (shown as triangles), of which there are 3 copies in each case. A dashed
line from a resource type to a schedule indicates that that resource can be assigned to that schedule.
The three cyclic bipartite graphs each correspond to a variable xi; the schedules sci correspond to
the three clauses in the formula.
• any edge corresponding to a clause that includes −xi; and
• any dummy edge.
Finally, let the utilities be: ∀t : Uc
d(t) = 1,Uu
d (t) = 0,Uc
a(t) = 0,Uu
a(t) = 1, so that we have a zero-sum
game.
We now prove that the optimal utility for the leader in this game is 1 if and only if the corresponding
boolean formula is satisﬁable.
The “if” case: Suppose there is an assignment of values {0,1} to the variables such that the formula
evaluates to 1. Then we can assign the resources in the game in the following way.
• For every clause in the boolean formula, choose one literal (+xi or −xi) that evaluates to “true” in the
assignment. Assign one of the corresponding resources (ωk
+xi or ωk
−xi, for some k) to the schedule
corresponding to the clause.
• For every xi = 0 (xi = 1), we assign all resources ωk
+xi (ωk
−xi) to cover the entire cyclic bipartite
graph corresponding to xi, using the horizontal (diagonal) edges.
• Assign the remaining resources to cover all the “dummy” schedules.
The resulting assignment of resources covers all targets, so that if the defender plays this pure strategy, the
defender’s utility is 1 in the security game.
The “only if” case: Suppose there is a defender strategy σ that gives the defender a utility of 1 in the
Stackelberg game. Then, every target must be covered with probability 1. That means that any pure strategy
on which σ puts positive probability must cover all the targets. So, without loss of generality, we can assume
σ is a pure strategy. We note that there are 2|C|·|V | resources and 4|C|·|V | targets in the game. Since each
schedule covers 2 targets, in σ, no two resources are assigned to schedules that share a target. Thus, each
7cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to a variable xi must have either all its horizontal edges covered (using
all the ωk
+xi), or all its diagonal edges covered (using all the ωk
−xi). If all the ωk
+xi are used to cover horizontal
edges, we set xi to 1; if all the ωk
−xi are used to cover diagonal edges, we set xi to 0. Now, for every clause
c ∈ C, the corresponding schedule is covered by some resource. If it is covered by some ωk
+xi, then +xi ∈ c,
and because in that case all the ωk
−xi must be used to cover the cyclic bipartite graph corresponding to xi
(using the diagonal edges), it must be that xi = 1. Similarly, if it is covered by some ωk
−xi, then −xi ∈ c,
and it must be that xi = 0. Hence we have a satisfying assignment.
If the resources are homogeneous, then it turns out that in the bipartite case, we can solve for an optimal
Stackelberg strategy in polynomial time, by using the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem in a slightly different
way. We consider that case in the following section.
5. Homogeneous resources, schedules of size at most 2, bipartite graph
In this section, we restrict ourselves to homogeneous resources, but now we consider schedules of size two.
When schedules have size two, they can be represented as a graph, whose vertices correspond to targets
and whose edges correspond to schedules. In this section, we consider the special case where this graph is
bipartite, and give a polynomial-time solution for it, again based on the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem.
One may wonder why this special case is interesting. In fact, it corresponds to the Federal Air Marshals
domain studied by Kiekintveld et al. (2009). In this domain, ﬂights are targets. If a Federal Air Marshal is
to be scheduled on one outgoing ﬂight from the U.S. (to, say, Europe), and will then return on an incoming
ﬂight, this is a schedule that involves two targets; moreover, there cannot be a schedule consisting of two
outgoing ﬂights or of two incoming ﬂights, so that we have the requisite bipartite structure.
We will use the following linear program to compute, for each schedule, the probability that one of the
(homogeneous) resources is assigned to that schedule. (Again, we need to solve n of these linear programs,
one for each value of t∗.)
maximize Ud(t∗,c)
subject to
∀s ∈ S : cs ≤ 1
∀t ∈ T : ct =
X
s∈S:t∈s
cs ≤ 1
X
s∈S
cs ≤ m
∀t ∈ T : Ua(t,c) ≤ Ua(t∗,c)
We note that nothing about this program speciﬁcally corresponds to the bipartite-schedules-of-size-two case.
Indeed, it is very similar to the mixed integer program for the general case presented by Kiekintveld et al.
(2009). However, in the general case, the solutions returned by both this linear program and the known mixed
integer program do not always correspond to implementable mixed strategies (we will give counterexamples
shortly). The contribution of this section is to show that in the bipartite-schedules-of-size-two case, the
solutions are in fact implementable.
5.1 Constructing a strategy that implements the LP solution
Again, we will use the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem to show this. Actually, we will use a slightly stronger
version of the theorem (which is not difﬁcult to prove using the basic version, Theorem 1), as follows:
Theorem4(StrengtheningofBvN). IfthematrixM inTheorem1additionallysatisﬁes
Pm
i=1
Pn
j=1 aij ≤ p,
where p is an integer, then we can obtain matrices Mk that additionally have the property that for each
1 ≤ k ≤ q,
Pm
i=1
Pn
j=1 ak
ij ≤ p.
8Figure 6: A counterexample that shows that with homogeneous resources and
schedules of size three, the linear program probabilities are not al-
ways implementable. The number of resources is m = 2. 6 tar-
gets are represented by round nodes, 6 schedules are represented by
square nodes with connections to the targets that they include. In
the optimal solution to the LP, the probability of a resource being
assigned to each schedule is 0.5, so that it would seem that the prob-
ability of each target being covered is 1. However, it is easy to see
that in reality, the two resources can cover at most 5 of the 6 targets
simultaneously.
Again, we will construct a matrix of probabilities M, where the probabilities in each row and the proba-
bilities in each column sum to at most 1. Because the graph is bipartite, the targets partition into T1,T2, with
no edges inside T1 or inside T2. The substochastic matrix M is constructed as follows.
M =
￿
Ms MT1
MT2 0|T2|×|T1|
￿
Here, 0|T2|×|T1| is a matrix of size |T2| × |T1|, consisting of only zeroes. The rows of the submatrix Ms
correspond to the targets in T1, and the columns of Ms correspond to the targets in T2. Each entry of the
matrix Ms is the probability c{t1,t2} that the schedule {t1,t2} is covered.
To represent the schedules of size 1, we use two square diagonal submatrices MT1 and MT2. For y ∈
{1,2}, element (i,i) of matrix MTy is equal to the probability c{ti} of a resource being assigned to cover
target ti ∈ Ty by itself; all the entries off the diagonal are 0.
By applying the strengthened Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, we can decompose M into a convex com-
bination of 0-1 matrices Mk, such that M =
Pq
k=1 wkMk. Every row and every column of each matrix Mk
contains no more than one element equal to 1, and the total number of 1s in Mk is no more than m. Each
Mk corresponds to a pure strategy for the defender. The pure strategy corresponding to 0-1 matrix Mk is to
place a defensive resource on every schedule of size two for which the corresponding cell of the submatrix
Ms is equal to 1, and to place a resource on every schedule of size one for which the corresponding cell of the
diagonal submatrix MT1 or MT2 is equal to 1. No target is covered twice in any one of these pure strategies,
because for each t ∈ T1 (t ∈ T2), there is at most one 1 in the row (column) corresponding to that t. The
mixed strategy is to play the pure strategy corresponding to Mk with probability wk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ q. By
doing so, the probability of covering target t ∈ T1 is indeed c{t} +
P
t∈T2 c{t1,t2} = ct (and similarly for
t ∈ T2). Hence, the marginal probabilities obtained from the linear program correspond to an implementable
strategy.
Theorem 5. When resources are homogeneous and schedules have size at most 2, and constitute a bipartite
graph, we can ﬁnd an optimal Stackelberg strategy in polynomial time. This can be done by solving a set of
polynomial-sized linear programs and then applying the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem.
6. Homogeneous Resources, Schedules of Size 2
We now return to the case where resources are homogeneous and schedules have size 2, but now we no
longer assume that the graph is bipartite. It turns out that if we use the linear program approach, the resulting
marginal probabilities cs are in general not implementable, that is, there is no mixed strategy that attains these
marginal probabilities. A counterexample is shown in Figure 4. This would appear to put us in a position
similar to that in the previous section. However, it turns out that here we can actually solve the problem in
polynomial time, using a different approach. Our approach here is to use the standard linear programming
approach fromSection 2. The downside of usingsuch approach isthatthereare exponentially many variables.
9In contrast, the dual linear program has only n + 1 variables, but exponentially many constraints. One
approach to solving a linear program with exponentially many constraints is the following: start with only
a small subset of the constraints, and solve the resulting reduced linear program. Then, using some other
method, check whether the solution is feasible for the full (original) linear program; and if not, ﬁnd a violated
constraint. If we have a violated constraint, we add it to the set of constraints, and repeat. Otherwise, we
have found an optimal solution. This process is known as constraint generation. Moreover, if a violated
constraint can be found in polynomial time, then the original linear program can be solved in polynomial
time using Ellipsoid algorithm. As we will show, in the case of homogeneous resources and schedules of
size two, we can efﬁciently generate constraints in the dual linear program by solving a weighted matching
problem. While this solution is less appealing than our earlier solutions based on the Birkhoff-von Neumann
theorem, it still results in a polynomial-time algorithm. The dual linear program follows.
minimize y
subject to
∀α :
X
t∈T
yt(Ua(α,t) − Ua(α,t∗)) + y ≥ Ud(α,t∗)
y ∈ R
Now, we consider the constraint generation problem for the dual LP. Given a (not necessarily feasible) solu-
tion yt,y to the dual, we need to ﬁnd the most violated constraint, or verify that the solution is in fact feasible.
Our goal is to ﬁnd, given the candidate solution yt,y,
α ∈ argmax
α Ud(α,t∗) −
X
t∈T
yt(Ua(α,t) − Ua(α,t∗)) − y
We introduce an indicator function Iα(t) which is equal to 1 if t is covered by α, and 0 otherwise. Then
Ua(α,t) = Uu
a(t) + Iα(t)(Uc
a(t) − Uu
a(t))
Ud(α,t) = Uu
d (t) + Iα(t)(Uc
d(t) − Uu
d (t))
Then, we can rearrange the optimization problem as follows.
α ∈ argmax
α
Uu
d (t∗) + Iα(t∗)(Uc
d(t∗) − Uu
d (t∗))
− y −
X
t∈T
yt(Uu
a(t) + Iα(t)(Uc
a(t) − Uu
a(t)))
+
X
t∈T
yt(Uu
a(t∗) + Iα(t∗)(Uc
a(t∗) − Uu
a(t∗)))
= Uu
d (t∗) − y −
X
t∈T
yt(Uu
a(t) − Uu
a(t∗))
+
X
t∈T
Iα(t)yt(Uu
a(t) − Uu
c (t))
− Iα(t∗)(Uu
a(t∗) − Uc
a(t∗))
X
t∈T
yt
We deﬁne a weight function on the targets as follows:
w(t) = yt(Uu
a(t) − Uc
a(t)) for t  = t∗
w(t∗) = −(Uu
a(t∗) − Uc
a(t∗))
X
t∈T,t =t∗
yt
10We then rearrange the optimization problem as follows:
α ∈ argmax
α
w(α) + Uu
d (t∗) −
X
t∈T
yt(Uu
a(t) − Uu
a(t∗)) − y
where w(α) is the total weight of the targets covered by the pure strategy α: w(α) =
P
t∈∪s∈αs w(t). The
only part of the objective that depends on α is w(α), so we can focus on ﬁnding an α that maximizes w(α).
A pure strategy α is a collection of edges (schedules consisting of pairs of targets). Therefore, the problem
of ﬁnding an α with maximum weight is a maximum weighted 2-cover problem, which can be solved in
polynomialtime(forexample, usingamodiﬁcationofthealgorithmforﬁndingamaximalweightedmatching
in general graphs (Galil, Micali, & Gabow, 1986)). So, we can solve the constraint generation problem, and
hence the whole problem, in polynomial time. From this analysis, the following theorem follows:
Theorem 6. When resources are homogeneous and schedules have size at most 2, we can ﬁnd an optimal
Stackelberg strategy in polynomial time. This can be done by solving the standard Stackelberg linear pro-
grams (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2006; von Stengel & Zamir, 2010): these programs have exponentially many
variables, but the constraint generation problem for the dual can be solved in polynomial time in this case.
7. Homogeneous Resources, Schedules of Size 3
We now move on to the case of homogeneous resources with schedules of size 3. Once again, it turns
out that if we use the linear program approach, the resulting marginal probabilities cs are in general not
implementable; that is, there is no mixed strategy that attains these marginal probabilities. A counterexample
is shown in Figure 6.
We now show that ﬁnding an optimal strategy for the leader in this case is actually NP-hard, even in
zero-sum games.
Theorem 7. When schedules have size 3, ﬁnding an optimal Stackelberg strategy is NP-hard, even when
resources are homogeneous and the game is zero-sum.
Proof. We reduce an arbitrary 3-cover problem instance—in which we are given a universe U, a family
S of subsets of U, such that each subset contains 3 elements, and we are asked whether we can (exactly)
cover all of U using |U|/3 elements of S—to a game with homogeneous resources and schedules of size
3. We create one target for each element of U, and one schedule for each element of S, which covers the
targets in it. We also create |U|/3 homogeneous resources that each can cover any schedule. The utilities are
∀t : Uc
d(t) = Uu
a(t) = 1,Uu
d (t) = Uc
a(t) = 0.
First, we will show that the answer is “yes” in the set cover problem instance if there is defender strategy
that gives the defender the utility of 1. Suppose there is defender strategy C that gives the defender the utility
of 1 in the Stackelberg setting. Since the game is zero sum, the attacker’s utility must be 0. It must be that
Ua(t,C) = 0 for each t ∈ T. That implies ct = 1 for all t. Then each target must be covered in each pure
strategy over which the defender is mixing in C. Thus there exists a pure strategy that covers each target with
no more than k resources. The set of schedules covered in that strategy corresponds to the subfamily C of
size no more than k such that the union of subsets in C is exactly U.
Next, we will show that if there exists a subfamily C of size no more than k, then there is defender strategy
that gives the defender utility of 1 in the Stackelberg game. Consider a pure strategy in which the defender
assigns a resource to each schedule that corresponds to a subset in C. Such pure strategy covers every target.
If the defender plays this pure strategy, attacker’s utility from attacking any target is equal to 0. Since the
game is zero sum, the defender’s utility is 1.
We have shown that the answer to the 3-Set Cover problem is positive if and only if the leader’s utility in
the corresponding resource allocation game is 1.
11Schedules
Hetero-
geneous
resources
size 1 size ≤ 2,
bipartite
size ≤ 2 size ≥ 3
No P P P NP-hard
Yes P NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard
Figure 7: Summary of the computational results. All of the hardness results hold even for zero-sum games.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the complexity of solving Stackelberg games in which pure strategies correspond to
allocations of resources, resulting in exponentially large strategy spaces. We precisely characterized in which
cases the problem is solvable in polynomial time (in some cases by solving linear programs of polynomial
size and appealing to the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, in another case by solving linear programs of
exponential size by using a polynomial-time constraint generation technique), and in which cases it is NP-
hard. The results for the case where the attacker has a single resource are given in Figure 7.
Our results are perhaps made more interesting by a recent paper by Yin et al. (Yin et al., 2010), which
shows that for all of the security games that we studied, an optimal Stackelberg strategy is guaranteed to also
be a Nash equilibrium strategy in the version of the game where commitment is not possible. (The converse
does not hold, that is, there can be Nash equilibrium strategies that are not Stackelberg strategies.) Thus,
our polynomial-time algorithm results also allow us to ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium strategy for the defender in
polynomial time. Conversely, for the cases where we prove a hardness result, ﬁnding a Nash equilibrium
strategy is also NP-hard, because our hardness results hold even for zero-sum games.
Presumably, the most important direction for future research is to address the NP-hard cases. Can we
ﬁnd algorithms that, although they require exponential time in the worst case, solve typical instances fast?
Can we identify additional restrictions on the game so that the problem becomes polynomial-time solvable?
Are there good polynomial-time approximation algorithms, or anytime algorithms that ﬁnd a reasonably good
solution fast? Another direction for future research is to consider security games with incomplete information
(Bayesian games) or multiple time periods (extensive-form games). In unrestricted games, these aspects can
lead to additional complexity (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2006; von Stengel & Zamir, 2010; Letchford, Conitzer,
& Munagala, 2009; Letchford & Conitzer, 2010).
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